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ABSTRACT:    In  this  paper  we  combine  a  model  of  Ricardian  comparative  advantages  as  in 
Dornbusch, Fisher and Samuelson (1977) with Grossman & Helpman's (1991) quality ladder model 
and  derive  the  consequences  of  absence  of  international  knowledge  mobility  (through  firm’s 
technology licensing) for the pattern of trade and the world rate of growth/innovation. Our analysis 
differs from that already made by Taylor (1994) in that the absence of knowledge mobility will here 
bring forth an infringement of comparative advantages which is by itself a factor of reduction in world 
growth. We also do some rough calibration of our model in order to compare it to the neoclassical 
growth model as to how big are the welfare losses from the absence of international capital mobility. 
 
RESUMO: Neste trabalho nós combinamos um modelo de vantagens comparativas Ricardianas, como 
em  Dornbush,  Fisher  and  Samuelson  (1977),  com  o  modelo  de  “escada  de  qualidade”  de 
Grossman&Helpman (1991), e analisamos as conseqüências da falta de mobilidade internacional do 
conhecimento (através do licenciamento das tecnologias das firmas) sobre o padrão de comércio e a 
taxa mundial de crescimento/inovação. Nossa análise difere da de Taylor (1994) em que aqui a falta de 
mobilidade internacional do conhecimento irá ocasionar uma violação das vantagens comparativas que 
é,  em  si  mesma,  um  fator  de  redução  na  taxa  de  crescimento.  Também  fazemos  uma  calibração 
grosseira do nosso modelo a fim de compará-lo com o modelo neoclássico de crescimento quanto a 
quão grandes são as perdas de bem-estar devido à ausência de mobilidade internacional do capital. 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  endogenous growth, Ricardian trade, technology licensing, capital mobility 
 
 
PALAVRAS-CHAVE:  crescimento  endógeno,  comércio  Ricardiano,  licenciamento  de  tecnologia, 
mobilidade de capital 
 
 
JEL classification: O31 , O33, O4 , O41 
 
 




   2 
1 - Introduction 
 
Trade  and  international  capital  movements  have  fundamentally  the  same  causes  and  effects. 
Nations different opportunity costs stand out among the principal causes. As a result, nations become 
more specialized and the world economy more efficient. But trade and capital movements, via foreign 
direct investment and licensing, are also the two main channels through which firms’ knowledge moves 
internationally. As a consequence, world innovation and growth are also expected to benefit from trade 
and capital movements
1. 
Historically, trade expansion, especially among developed countries, has been one of the major 
drives of world economic growth in the post-World War II period. The U.S. economy has played a 
leading role in this expansion as the largest producer and exporter of goods. But the U.S. share, both as 
a  producer  and  exporter  of  goods,  has  declined  as  the  counterpart  of  the  rising  shares  of  Japan, 
Germany, other European countries and, more recently, other Asian countries. In point of fact, U.S. 
exports accounted for 18 percent of total imports from other OECD countries in 1970, 16 percent 
between 1980 and 1984, and only 12 percent of world exports between 1992 and 1996
2. However, the 
U.S. economy still revealed comparative advantage in almost half of the products traded internationally 
in this latter period
3, while the other nations tended to be much more specialized. 
Indeed, natural and artificial trade barriers, despite the liberalization achieved by some rounds of 
multilateral  trade  agreements  under  the  auspices  of  Gatt,  remained  a  significant  obstacle  to  the 
expansion of large exporting firms in the developed world. The problem was aggravated in the early 
1980s by the world recession and the large trade imbalances in the  world economy. The tensions 
generated by the large trade deficits of the U.S., on one side, the large trade surpluses of Japan and 
Germany, on the other, and secondarily, the need for some large indebted developing countries to 
generate substantial trade surpluses led to a more protectionist stance in the world. The response of the 
private sector did not take too long. Since the mid-1980s, the world economy has witnessed a very 
rapid increase in the international  mobility of  firms’  capital and  knowledge through foreign direct 
investment (FDI) and licensing. 
Large Japanese firms that had focused their strategy in expanding export sales started a massive 
relocation of productive capacity, with heavy foreign direct investment in the U.S. and other developed 
countries. North-American and European firms followed suit. Singapore, the Republic of Korea and 
Taiwan (China) have also joined this club, first as recipients of capital and knowledge, but later as 
significant producers of technology and exporters of capital and knowledge
4. During the course of this 
process of large flows of FDI, U.S. exports have become much more specialized, though their share in 
world exports has tended to stabilize. In fact, the share of U.S. exports in OECD imports was 13 
percent between 2000 and 2004 compared to 12 percent between 1992 and 1996, while the number of 
products in which the U.S. revealed comparative advantage fell from 48 to 39 percent of all traded 
goods.  It  should  also  be  noted  that  the  U.S.  has  remained,  over  this  whole  period,  the  leading 
                                                 
1 See Madsen (2007) for empirical evidence that knowledge has been transmitted internationally through the channel of 
trade 
 
2 See Comtrade, United Nations or PcTas, Unctad. 
 
3 Out of 1030 four-digit products of the Standard International Trade Classification (SITC), the U.S. revealed comparative 
advantage (Ballassa’s indicator) in 48% of them. 
 
4 Brahmbhatt and Hu (2007).   3 
innovating nation, bringing together the largest number of researchers, spending the largest volume of 
resources in R&D and producing the largest number of patents. 
The main purpose of this paper is to develop a theoretical model that accounts for the above 
mentioned stylized facts, allowing us to examine the effects of the movement in firms’ knowledge 
among  developed  countries,  through  FDI  and  licensing,  on  their  trade  patterns,  and  on  global 
innovation and growth. To do so we follow Taylor’s (1994) approach, taking a Ricardian comparative 
advantage model, with a continuum of rising quality products, as our starting point. 
This approach seems to make sense because, on the one hand, relative unitary labor costs in 
specific industries vary considerably among different countries, and the evidence presented by Carlin et 
al. (2001) shows very convincingly that this variable is crucial in explaining changes in export market 
shares  of  OECD  countries  by  industries  in  their  intra-trade.  On  the  other  hand,  the  use  of  an 
endogenous growth (quality ladder) model is in line with Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) conclusion that 
“if the benefits of international financial integration are large, they must occur through channels that 
are  not  in  the  standard  neoclassical  framework”.
5  While  in  the  neoclassical  growth  model  the 
distortion  caused  by  the  absence  of  capital  mobility  is  of  a  transitory  nature,  in  Taylor’s  setup 
asymmetric IPRs protection
6 will prevent capital mobility for R&D purposes, leading to a negative and 
permanent (steady-state) effect on the efficiency with which world resources are employed. 
In Taylor’s setup, international mobility for R&D purposes assumes three different forms: the 
first and perhaps most important is “licensing”, when a domestic innovative firm authorizes other firm 
to produce a new good abroad in exchange for royalties payments. The second form is "international 
R&D financing", when home savings can hire skilled labour abroad to conduct research there, because 
wages are lower or research technology more productive - to illustrate, this might take the form of a 
world stock market for innovative firms. Thus we can have, in principle, international R&D financing 
without licensing and vice versa. Both concepts share the common feature that they promote higher 
returns to savings and involve some kind of international transferability
7, and this is why  we  will 
interchangeably  speak  here  of  “international  capital  mobility”  or  of  “international  knowledge 
mobility”. Finally, there is “research technology transfer”, that is when potential innovators can take 
their R&D technologies abroad and use them with foreign labor, so that one of the inefficiencies that 
may arise is due to the choice of less than best R&D techniques. Here we leave this latter form aside, 
and focus exclusively on the consequences of no capital mobility through specialization in trade and in 
R&D.     
However, we depart from Taylor´s model with regard to its particular assumption that final goods 
production and R&D technologies, expressed in terms of labor inputs functions, bear a cross-goods and 
cross-countries identical proportion – so that if country A, in order to produce a given good, needs half 
the labor input that country B does, then it also requires half the labor input to quality-innovate this 
good  with  the  same  probability  that  country  B.  Though  analytically  attractive,  this  assumption 
                                                 
 
5 Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003), pg. 3 
 
6 Under asymmetric protection, foreign made innovations are not treated the same as domestic as each country only offers 
protection to domestically produced innovations.” (Taylor, 1994, p.362) 
 
7 This transferability may take the form of knowledge mobility, when a good has been innovated in country A and is 
produced in country B by licensing; or it may take the form of financial resources mobility when country B’s residents 
acquire claims on country A’s production because this last country’s savings are hiring skilled labor in country B to conduct 
research. 
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nonetheless appears to be somewhat at odds with the stylized fact (reported in the Appendix) that 
countries are more specialized in final goods production than in R&D activity: Taking OECD countries 
2 by 2, with the United States always standing as the “big” partner, we find that countries differ much 
more in their relative trade positions (measured by Revealed Comparative Advantage coefficients) than 
in their relative patenting positions (measured by  Patell & Pavitt’s (1995) Revealed Technological 
Advantage coefficients).  
Here we entirely disconnect final goods production and R&D technologies, assuming that the 
ranking of comparative advantages tends to be stable over time and heterogeneous across goods (as a 
result  of  stemming  from  permanent  features  such  as  the  existence  of  specific  natural  resources, 
geographic location, climate and topology, or from historically developed factors such as labor skills 
and infrastructure for specific industries), while the labor inputs for innovation are uniform across 
goods and identical internationally, as in Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
As  a  result  of  our  assumptions,  our  model  predicts  that  in  the  absence  of  firm’s  knowledge 
mobility  through  FDI  and  licensing,  specialization  according  to  Ricardian  comparative  advantage 
breaks  down  for  a  range  of  products.  Ricardian  heterogeneity  on  the  production  side  implies  that 
instantaneous profits from innovation are bigger for those goods in which a country has comparative 
advantage. However, what an innovative firm maximises is not instantaneous profit, but the "value" of 
its patent given by the present discounted value of a flow of monopolist instantaneous profits. This 
flow will be longer the more time it takes for that patent or vintage to become obsolete, that is, the 
smaller  is  the  risk  of  obsolescence  or  innovative  effort  in  that  industry.  Therefore,  under  rational 
expectations equilibrium, it will pay off for a relatively large and more innovative country (say, the 
U.S.)  to  “invade”  the  other  country’s comparative  advantage  range  of  goods  to  take  advantage  of 
smaller obsolescence risks there. Under international knowledge mobility, on the contrary, FDI and 
licensing would naturally prevent this “invasion” behaviour. This is consistent with our stylized fact 
regarding the change in the U.S. pattern of specialization during the recent boom in the flows of FDI. It 
is also interesting to notice how this “invasion effect” is reminiscent of the old “technology gaps” ideas 
from I.O. literature.
8 In turn, under Taylor’s assumption that production and R&D technologies go 
along exactly together, even without capital mobility invasion would not occur because the incentive to 
invade the other country’s comparative advantage range of goods (infinitesimally smaller instantaneous 
profits  and  discretely  smaller  obsolescence  risks)  is  completely  cancelled  off  by  bigger 
research/innovation costs. 
In our setup, the other consequence of no knowledge mobility is that more skilled labor will be 
allocated to final goods production and less to R&D activity. Given cross-countries and cross-goods 
identical productivities in research, it is possible to demonstrate that this unambiguously implies slower 
world growth or a smaller global quantity of innovation. Besides, since some final goods production 
will be carried over outside the range of comparative advantage where it would be efficient to produce, 
that extra amount of labor allocated to it will not imply a bigger instantaneous consumption.  Summing 
up the two effects (slower growth and not bigger instantaneous consumption), we have that the absence 
of knowledge mobility is welfare reducing. 
Our chief analytical contribution thus lies in showing that the efficient allocation of resources 
given by comparative advantages may break down for some products under the absence of international 
capital mobility, reducing innovation and growth. Therefore, ignoring this source of inefficiency, one 
tends to underestimate the positive effect of greater international financial integration. To support this 
                                                 
8 For example, according to Dosi, Pavitt and Soete (1990, pg.11), “…the international composition of trade by countries 
within each sector appears to be essentially explained by technology gaps, while comparative advantage mechanisms appear 
to be of lesser importance.”   5 
statement we do some rough calibration and simulation exercises in order to assess how big the welfare 
gains from financial integration in our model are compared to analogous figures from the neoclassical 
model. We find that, when trading partners differ considerably in size (as is the case when we take the 
U.S. on one side and any other OECD country on the other), the welfare gain is equivalent to an almost  
10% permanent increase in per capita consumption, considerably bigger than what Gourinchas and 
Jeanne (2003) or Mendoza and Tesar (1998) had found.  So the story we tell in this paper perhaps helps 
explaining the divergence of the 80’s and 90’s, when rich countries increased their growth rates above 
most medium and low income countries − after all, that was also a period of increased capital and 
knowledge mobility, patent law harmonization, etc., among rich countries. 
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 provides a description of our basic setup: a Ricardian 
trade model with a continuum of rising quality products. In section 3 we analyse the case of complete 
absence of international capital mobility, and the concomitant “invasion” phenomenon. In section 4 we 
formally prove that the equilibrium global quantity of innovation is bigger under international capital 
mobility, for what we still use a generalized function to describe production technologies in final goods 
(countries’ relative labor inputs). In section 5 we impose a specific functional form to describe relative 
labor inputs and do the above mentioned calibration/simulation exercise. Section 6 concludes. The 
Appendix contains the empirical evidence on countries specialization in production and R&D. 
 
2 -  A Ricardian Model with a Continuum of Rising Quality Products 
(description of the assembled model) 
 
Let us briefly review the basic characteristics of the quality ladder model in a closed economy 
and then combine it with a Ricardian trade model with a continuum of goods
9. The demand side of the 
economy is determined by agents maximizing the following functional: 
 
with the instantaneous utility function given by 
 
 
,where  x m,τ (z)  denotes the consumption of or the demand for the m
th quality or generation of good z at 
time τ, and  qm(z) is an index of quality. It is assumed that qo = 1 for every good z. Once the appropriate 
choices between qualities of the same good and between different goods are made, the instantaneous 
utility  will vary  along the equilibrium growth  path according to increments in the quality indexes 
resulting from the innovation activity. 
Two  important  properties  of  this  instantaneous  utility  function  are:  1)  it  follows  from  its 
maximization that the nominal amount spent on each good will be the same; and 2) once agents choose 
                                                 
9 This section draws heavily on the Ricardian model presented in Dornbusch et al.(1977) and on the model of rising quality 
product presented in chapter 4 of Grossman and Helpman (1991). 
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among qualities or generations of the same good that one which brings the greater quality per unit of 
money, the elasticity of substitution between any pair of goods will be equal to 1.  
At each point in time, income may be broken  down into wages and instantaneous profits of 
monopolist firms, and is spent on consumption and acquisition of shares of prospective (innovating) 
firms. Therefore, aggregate saving is used to hire labor for innovative purposes. 
The  innovation  process  and  the  pattern  of  firms  competition  are  intimately  related:  each 
successful attempt to innovate on good z will raise its quality by the exogenously given factor λ , so 
that qm(z) = λ
m-n⋅qm-n(z), λ > 1
10. The different qualities of the same good are perfect substitutes of each 
other. Therefore, each new m
th generation of a good can be charged up to λ
m-n times the previous n
th 
generation.  If  it  is  charged  any  infinitesimal  amount  less  than  this,  the  producer  of  the  previous 
generation will be driven out of the market. Admitting free-disposal, the limit-price for leaving the 
market is the unit-cost of final good z, or a(z).W , with W representing nominal wages and a(z) the labor 
input per unit of good z 
11. 
As Grossman&Helpman (1991) show, assuming free  capital  mobility for R&D purposes and 
perfectly non cumulative knowledge
12, then no quality leader will undertake research, and thus goods 
will be priced by a mark-up that is only one quality index λ over the unit cost: 
 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )      ,    ,   ,   z p W z a m z p m z = ⋅ ⋅ = ∀ λ .
13 
 
The model is closed by two market clearing conditions and a free-entry condition in the R&D 
market: according to this last condition, a positive but limited level of R&D will occur only if the 
expected value of a new firm or blueprint be equal to the expected cost of performing an innovation. 
Equilibrium in the labor market requires the sum of demand for labor in manufacturing with that in the 
R&D sector to be equal to the labor endowment of the economy. Equilibrium in the assets market is 
expressed in terms of the usual condition that the expect return on any firm's stock be equal to the 
return on an equal size investment in a riskless bond. This is equivalent to the condition that firms be 
valued according to the "fundamentals", that is, the present discounted value of their flows of profits. 
These  conditions  determine  the  dynamics  of  the  two  endogenous  variables,  the  aggregate 
intensity of research and the value of firms at each moment in time. They can be summarized by a 
differential equation and a contour condition that establishes whether the aggregate value of the firms is 
rising, falling or is constant. In determining the steady-state of the economy, rational expectations are 
used to rule out trajectories along which both the aggregate intensity of research and the value of firms 
tend to zero or the latter grows without bound while the former remains positive. 
                                                 
10 λ may also be determined endogenously, see Grossman and Helpman (1991), page 106 
 
11 a(z) is assumed to be equal to 1 for any good  z  in Grossman’s & Helpman's version of the model. 
 
12 "Perfectly non cumulative knowledge" is an expression borrowed from Dosi (1984) regarding transmission of product 
specific knowledge. It means that in spite of property rights or costs  which prevent imitation of current state-of-arts 
products and thus guarantee monopolistic rent to innovators, the current owner of a state-of-arts product has no advantage 
over other innovators in bringing forth a new vintage of that product. Actually, Dosi himself thinks to be a stylised fact 
about innovation some degree of cumulativeness. As we shall see at section II below, when transposed to international 
competition in R.&D. this assumption of perfectly non cumulative knowledge will play a fundamental role in determining 
the allocation of research efforts. 
 
13 In particular, in Grossman & Helpman's version of the model, with a(z) = 1 for every z, and with goods entering the utility 
function symmetrically, every good will be priced λ.W in general equilibrium.   7 
On  the  supply  side,  our  version  of  the  quality  ladder  model  assumes  that  labor  input  is 
independent of product generation, but Ricardian comparative advantages make it depend upon the 
particular good being produced and the country which produces, so that: 
 
(3)           ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) z a m z a z a m z a z qm * , *     and     ,     ,     = = ∀                   
 
,where   qm(z) stands for the quality of the m
th generation of product z 
    a(z,m)  is the labor input per unit produced of the m
th generation of product z in the domestic                 
country, with the superscript “*” denoting “the rest of the world”. 
 
In an international context, we assume a pattern of price competition such that, whatever is the 
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, with W and W* representing nominal wages. Underlying expression (4) is a well defined assumption 
regarding international knowledge spillovers: Any firm in any country can produce any good  z , at 
period  t,  with  the  pre-state-of-arts  quality,  e.g.,  max  ( ) ( ))     ,   (
*
1 1 z q z q t t − − .  As  a  consequence, 
whenever an innovator produces a quality jump, he will be facing a competitive fringe which is able to 
produce the pre-state of the art version of that good at the international minimum cost, thus imposing 
an upper bound to his monopoly price. 
World-wide consumption expenditure is normalized to E = 1. As a result, given the demand 
function for each good resulting from maximization of (2) subject to (4), profits may be calculated as: 
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,where  π (z,m)  is the profits earned by the producer of the m
th generation of product z in the home 
country, and the term [λ.min(a(z).W , a*(z).W*)]
 −1 =  p(z)
−1  gives the demanded quantity.  
         Technology is assumed to be so smooth that, given a vector of nominal wages (domestic and 
international), there always exists a good  z ~  for which domestic and international unitary costs are 
equal. Formally, 
 
(6)                 ( ) ( ) ( ) * ~ * ~         ~        ,   * , given   W z a W z a z W W ⋅ = ⋅ ∋ ∃                     
          
                                                 
14 This very pattern is assumed by Yang and Maskus (2001) when they say that "For the leading firm in the Northern 
market, its closest competitor is the Southern firm that can produce the second-level quality product" (pg. 177).  Of course, 
they also assume there that the South has the lowest wage.    
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         The set of goods Z = [0 , 1] may be reordered so that 
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,that is, profits are smaller whenever a country produces outside its comparative advantage. 
 
 
3 – the general case without international financial capital mobility 
 
         In  a  model  in  which  there are  both  international  R&D  financing  and  licensing,  as  in  Taylor 
(1993), research and production for each good are carried where they cost less. It is only international 
financial capital mobility that opens up the possibility that these two activities be conducted in separate 
locations. Notwithstanding this, in the particular case in which research costs are heterogeneous and 
exactly proportional to production costs in each country, even in the absence of international capital 
mobility the coinciding ranges of specialization in production and in R&D will be given by  z ~  defined 
above,  as  in  Taylor  (1994)
15:    comparative  advantages  are  not  infringed,  whether  there  is  capital 
mobility or not. Here, we will assume that there are neither international R&D financing nor licensing. 
Also, as a form to capture the stylized fact (reported in the Appendix) that countries are much less 
specialized in R&D than in final goods production, we will follow Grossman & Helpman's (1991) 
uniform specification of research technology, so that in any country it takes h.ι  units of labor for a firm 
targeting  any  good  to  succeed  in  innovating  with  probability  ι  ;  while  final  goods  production 
technologies are summarized by the strictly decreasing, continuous function A(z) described in the last 
section.  
Those latter assumptions will blur the clear-cut patterns of specialization in production and in 
research found in Taylor (1994). In particular, it can be shown that two situations do not hold in a 
rational expectations equilibrium of our model: (i) it’s not an equilibrium a situation in which each 
country produces and innovates inside its comparative advantages range as defined by  z ~  above, except 
for the zero probability event that the two countries, by doing so, present the same equilibrium intensity 
                                                 
15 See footnote 19 below. Notice that in his paper, Taylor (1994) calls the situation without financial capital mobility 
“asymmetric IPRs protection”.   9 
or probability of innovation; (ii) it’s not an equilibrium a situation in which both countries target a 
same good to be innovated. 
16 
To see why this must be so, let’s begin by considering the standard non-arbitrage condition in the 
assets market, namely that instantaneous profits plus the change in the value of a firm less the expected 
value of a total loss due to obsolescence be equal to the instantaneous return to a riskless asset of equal 
value: 
 
(9)                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) z v r z v z v z ⋅ = ⋅ − +
•
ι π               
 
,where v(z) denotes the discounted value of a firm's profits flow. With  ρ = r , and in steady-state, (9) 
gives 
 
(9’)                 ( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) z z z v π ρ ι ⋅ + =
−1                        
 
Besides, if there is free-entry in the R&D activity and a finite amount of R&D expenditure, then 
the expected gain from innovation, namely the value of a firm, must be equal to the research cost. That 
latter  being  identical  for  all  goods  (due  to  the  uniform  specification  of  the  R&D  technology),  in 
equilibrium the values of all firms in a national market must be the same.  
That being so, consider a situation in which the home country is targeting for innovation only 
]   ~ ,   0   [    z z∈  while the rest of the world is targeting  ] 1   ,   z ~   [    ∈ z  and, without loss of generality, assume 
that the uniform equilibrium innovative efforts are such that  *   ι ι > . 
17 Call this situation (i), depicted in 
figure 1 below.  
 
PROPOSITION : Situation (i) cannot hold. 
 
PROOF: By (7) and (8) we know that the instantaneous profits corresponding to a given good 
z z ~       ' > ,  should  the  home  country  hold  the  patent  for  its  production,  will  be  smaller  than  those 
corresponding to a good inside the home country’s comparative advantage range. However, from the 
point of view of a domestic firm, 
 
(10)                  ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )  

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λ
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1 1 1 w z A z z v                   
Because the function A(z) is continuous, with A’(z) < 0  and  ( ) [ ] 1 ~ 1 = ⋅
− w z A , then under ρ 
=ρ* and ι discretely bigger than ι*  there must exist a non zero measure connected set Z’ of elements z’ 
> z ~  such that v(z’) > ) z ~ ( v . Therefore situation (i) cannot hold.  
 
                                                 
16 Here we prove only the first statement. For a proof of the second, please refer to our MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX, 
available at the reader’s request  
 
17 Without loss of generality because, except for particular parameter values, in general we will have  *       ι ι ≠ .  Those 
innovative efforts must be uniform, that is,  ( ) ] ~ , 0 [   ,      z z z ∈ ∀ =ι ι , because all goods inside the comparative advantages 
range are equally profitable and Grossman&Helpman assume that stockholders prefer portfolio diversification.  
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         This  implies  that  a  "big"  home  country  will  also  target  some  goods  beyond  its  comparative 
advantage range. As the home country’s innovative efforts move away from  z ~ , instantaneous profits as 
given by (8) above decay because the A(z) function is strictly decreasing. In view of (9’) this implies 
that equalization of all the home country’s firms values will require the function ι(z') to be also strictly 
decreasing. That is, as the home country moves away from its comparative advantage, it invests less 
and less in innovation. Decaying instantaneous profits call for decaying obsolescence risks – it is for 
this reason that the rest of the world will not target any good in the home country’s invasion range (see 
situation  (ii)  above):  comparative  advantages  imply  that  the  rest  of  the  world’s  profits  would  be 
maximal and identical for all such goods, what would in turn require identical, constant obsolescence 
risks. 
In the end, having rejected situations (i) and (ii) above, it follows that the rational expectations 
equilibrium picture of the world, which we call situation (iii) depicted in figure 2 below, is such that:  
the  home  country  will  alone  target  goods  from  0  to  z z ~ ˆ > ,  exhibiting  an  uniform  intensity  ι  in 
] ~ , 0 [ z and some positive, decreasing intensity ι (z') in  ( ) z z ˆ , ~ , while the rest of the world will exhibit 
an uniform ι* for  z z ˆ ≥ . The good  z ˆ  represents some threshold whereupon the home country will not 
invest.
18  Surprisingly  perhaps,  production  costs  heterogeneity  and  equalization  of  firms'  values  is 
enough to guarantee that the Ricardian model will not present any patent races between countries, for 
they will be targeting separated ranges of goods even without capital mobility.
19 
 
The labor market clearing conditions
20 are thus: 
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,where L is the home country’s endowment of skilled labor; the first term on the right side of the 
equality  is  labor  demand  for  R&D;  the  second  is  labor  demand  for  goods  production  inside  the 
comparative  advantages  range,  and  the  last  term  is  labor  demand  for  production  outside  the 
comparative advantages range. For the rest of the world, 
 
                                                 
18 Accordingly, it must be 
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1 1 ) ˆ ( 1 ) ˆ ( *   , so that  ) ˆ ( * z ι  is already the homogenous ι*. 
 
19 In Taylor (1994), not only countries will be targeting separated sets of goods, as those will coincide with the comparative 
advantage ranges (sets). This is a consequence of the particular, perfect link he assumes to hold between production and 
research technologies: if a(z) and a*(z) are the labor inputs to produce good z respectively at the home country and in the 
rest of the world, then the corresponding labor inputs for research are aI  = µ(z).a(z)  and  aI* = µ(z).a*(z). Consider then a 
potential invading home country's firm were to devote a marginal innovation effort of size ιi  on a good z' > z ~ . Because the 
free-entry condition holds in the rest of the world, this firm's expected return would be ιi .W*.aI* = ιi .W*.µ(z).a*(z'), while 
the cost would be    ιi .W.aI  = ιi .W.µ(z).a(z'). It follows from z'  belonging to the rest of the world's comparative advantage 
range that W*.a*(z')< W. a(z'), and therefore that this cost is bigger than the expected return. 
 
20 Without international financial capital mobility, equilibrium in the labor markets implies equilibrium in the balance of 
payments, that is, in the balance of trade.   11 
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,since the rest of the world is the “small country” which produces and innovates only inside a subset of 
its comparative advantage. Bearing in mind the above notation, one can establish the following non-
arbitrage (N-A) and free entry conditions (F-E): 
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Figure 1: the pattern of R&D investment in  a  Ricardian  World  corresponding to the hypothetical 
situation (i) above. The home country’s investment function is drawn in blue, the rest of the world’s in 
red; the subscript “R” stands for Ricardian. 
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Figure 2: the true pattern of R&D investment in a Ricardian World without capital mobility, 
corresponding to situation (iii) above. The home country’s investment function is drawn in blue, the 
rest of the world’s in red. Notice there is no duplication of R&D efforts. 
 
 
4 - the global quantity of innovation 
 
Here we show that whatever the functional form describing the strictly decreasing relative labor 
inputs function A(z), the Ricardian trade model will display a smaller global quantity of innovation, and 
therefore slower growth, in the absence of international capital mobility. To do this, we will compare 
the global quantity of innovation emerging from the general case described in the last section with that 
emerging from a world where there are both international R&D financing and licensing and, besides, 
both  countries  remain  doing  some  research  activity  ("diversification  in  R&D"  assumption).  Given 
identical  innovation  technologies  across  countries,  this  latter  assumption  amounts  to  Factor  Price 
Equalization (FPE) − otherwise there would be a cheapest location where all the R&D activity would 
be conducted. Notwithstanding the apparent loss of generality, as Taylor (1994) shows, FPE is not, by 
far, a zero probability event in our class of models, occurring whenever countries do not differ too 
much in relative sizes and relative advantages.
21 
Let's begin with the international capital mobility case, for it is very straightforward. First notice 
that in this case comparative advantages are not violated, that is, all final goods are produced where it is 
cheaper. Call  z ~ , as before, the last final good in which the home country has comparative advantage, 
and  z  the last good in which it conducts R&D. Under FPE, W denotes the wage rate in both countries. 
The common interest rate is denoted by ρ. Equilibrium in labor markets can then be expressed as: 
 







+ ⋅ ⋅ ~
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21 The proof specific to our setup is given in the MATHEMATIC APPENDIX available at the reader’s request. The case for 
FPE is also made more acceptable when one bears in mind that in this model the only production factor is “skilled labor”, 
something like an engineer or scientist who can move from research to production and who could, conceivably, move from 
one country to another.   13 
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,where  M M E    and    ι   are  respectively  the  uniform  intensity  of  innovation  and  the  worldwide 
consumption expenditure under capital mobility. The first term on the left side of each equality is labor 
demand for R&D purposes, and the second is the amount of labor employed in final goods production. 
Summing (13) and (13'), and bearing in mind that by the free-entry condition it must be  h W vM ⋅ =    
and that by the non-arbitrage condition it must be  ) ( ) 1 (
1 ρ ι λ + − =
−
M M v  , we arrive at 
 














           
 
, the equilibrium uniform intensity of innovation under capital mobility and FPE. The global quantity 
of innovation, or expected number of innovations, is simply given by ιM  times 1, the measure of the 
final goods’ set.  
 
To derive the global quantity of innovation without capital mobility, consider again the system 
comprising (11), (11'), (12) and (12'). Notice we can write the relative labor input function as: 
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Then by (11) the amount of labor the home country spends for final goods production in the 
range where it invades the rest of the world's comparative advantage is 
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, since, by definition of  z ~ in (6) and (7),   1
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z A .   D  represents the integral of the changes 




                                                 






























.  In the right side of this last equality, both derivatives are negative and 
therefore the total differential is positive. As to the second derivative, it depends on the functional form chosen to describe 
the α  (that is, the relative labor input A) function. Working with a general, non-specified, function, all we can say is the 
steeper is α the bigger the additional amount of labor the home country will spend for producing final goods in an invasion 
range of a given measure.  For a rigorous formula for the term D, we ask the reader, again, to refer to the 
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX.   14 
Consider now the amount of labor the home country spends to perform innovation in the invasion 
range, 
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Using (15) and the definition of  z ~  in (6), we can solve (12, N-A) for  ( ) '   z ι  as a function of the 
uniform ι : 
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So that the intensity of innovation decreases as one advances into the invasion range. If, on the 
contrary, the α function were constant with  ( ) ( ) 1 ~ ' = = z z α α , then  ( ) ι ι = ' z . Thus we can write: 
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, that is, C is the absolute value of the integral of the negative changes in the amount of labor spent for 
innovative purposes as one moves away from the home country’s comparative advantage. 
 
Thanks  to  Grossman&Helpman’s  (1991)  special  functional  forms,  our  model  displays  the 
interesting feature that, independent from the functional form of the α function, C = D, that is, the 
amount of labor which is saved through smaller innovation intensities in the invasion range is exactly 
equal to the additional amount of labor spent in final goods production. 
23 So we can rewrite (11) as 
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Solving  (19), (11'), (12) and (12') for the uniform intensities of innovation, and assuming ρ* = ρ 
, comes 
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In the invasion range, using (17’), the quantity of innovation can be calculated as  
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So the global quantity of innovation without capital mobility is 
                                                 
23 This result, involving some more tedious calculations, is demonstrated in the MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX   15 
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, where  M ι  is given by (14). Therefore we have just proved that the global quantity of innovation is 
necessarily  bigger  under  capital  mobility.  The  intuition  for  this  result  involves  both  the  standard 
Schumpeterian effect "less competition → bigger potential monopolist profits → more innovation", and 
a  general  equilibrium,  allocative  effect.  The  first  effect  follows  from  the  fact  that  without  capital 
mobility and outside the comparative advantages range smaller instantaneous profits will accrue to 
"invading  firms"  (see  expression  8  above);  and  since  financial  capital  remains  mobile  inside  their 
country, equalization of returns to R&D investments calls for smaller innovative efforts in the invasion 
range
24.  Under  international  capital  mobility,  on  the  contrary,  instantaneous  profits  are  maximal 
through all the set of final goods. The allocative effect follows from the fact that, having to face a sharp 
foreign competitive fringe (recall the paragraph below expression 4 ) invading firms will set “low” 
prices on final goods, reflecting in a high demand. But being outside the comparative advantage range 
means that, given a vector of wages
25, it takes more labor input to meet that demand. What’s more, here 
we saw how these two effects combine: none of the labour drawn away from the R&D activity in the 
invasion range will flow into more intense innovation inside the comparative advantages range − it will 
be all sunken into inefficient final goods production inside the very invasion range. 
          
5 - a quantitative assessment of the effects of the absence of international capital mobility 
 
         Gourinchas  and  Jeanne  (2003)  use  a  Ramsey-Cass-Koopman  model  with  a  logarithmic 
instantaneous  utility,  as  in  our  equation  (1)  above,  to  estimate  the  impact  of  financial  integration 
(physical capital mobility) on the welfare (infinite lifetime utility) of a non-OECD country. Developing 
countries have a smaller initial capital per capita level than developed countries that are assumed to 
have  already  achieved  the  steady-state  (that  is,  with  no  capital  gap).  Under  financial  integration, 
physical capital will flow from countries where it is abundant to countries where it is scarce because in 
those latter the marginal product of capital is bigger than the world interest rate. However, inasmuch as 
developed countries are already in steady-state, the world interest rate is equal to the natural rate of 
interest which is the same for all countries, reflecting common parameters such as the long run growth 
rate in labor productivity and the intertemporal discount rate. That being so, financial integration will 
not "tilt" permanently consumption profiles. For a given country, the long run levels of output and 
consumption per capita will be the same under autarky and financial integration. Therefore, the effect 
of free physical capital mobility is transitory: to accelerate poor countries' convergence to the steady-
state, making a smoothing in consumption profiles possible. In the end, Gourinchas and Jeanne find 
small welfare gains from financial integration despite substantial initial capital gaps: the average non-
OECD country will enjoy a Hicksian equivalent variation (defined as the percentage increase in autarky 
                                                 
24 As Antweiler (1995) points, according to the usual non-arbitrage condition on the research activity what one expects to 
observe is an inverse relation between innovation intensities and relative production or research costs across industries. His 
chief concern, however, is with microeconomic incentives for conducting R&D explaining international differences in 
growth performance; roughly speaking, following the logic of the “inverse relation” countries whose economic policies 
impose high costs on R&D will undergo low rates of innovation. 
 
25 That in this situation W < W* follows immediately from (12) and (12’) with  *       ι ι >    16 
consumption at each point of time that brings welfare up to its level under financial integration) around 
1,24.
26 
Compared to this, how big can be the gains from financial integration in our endogenous growth 
model? The answer of course depends on relative countries sizes and the functional form of the relative 
labor input A(z) function: if countries are practically the same size and A(z) is flat (weak comparative 
advantages), then what we called the invasion range will be small and inside it final goods production 
will not require so much more labor input than inside the comparative advantage range, so that we may 
expect quite small losses from the absence of capital mobility. However, a presumption that under 
fairly general conditions the gains from financial integration are big rests on the fact that, unlike the 
neoclassical growth model, in our class of models we are dealing with steady-state, permanent effects. 
For our simulation exercise we chose the hyperbolic functional form  ( ) [ ] 1   , 0     ,    0 ∈ = z z A z A  
because it renders calculations in the Mathematica
 program tolerably simple. For example, inside the 






z A ⋅ = . Also, we normalize the parameter A0 so that comparative advantages 
be symmetrical, that is  ( ) 5 , 0 5 , 0 1 0
1 = ⇒ =
− A A . Then the home country will invade the rest of the 
world's comparative advantage if and only if   L  > L*.  
A few comments are due on the rough calibration work we did: Gourinchas and Jeanne adopt the 










    ln β , where cs is consumption at time s.  Thus our corresponding continuous time 
parameter  must  be  04 , 0 ln ≅ − = β ρ .  Next  we  take  the  contribution  of  Total  Factors  Productivity 
(TFP) to the observable growth rate in output per worker for OECD countries over the period 1960-
1985 found in Hall and Jones (1999): a 0,86% per year TFP component in an overall mean growth rate 
of 2,23% per year, and assume that this is the outcome of a situation without international capital 
mobility.  This  figure  will  correspond  to  the  growth  rate  of  the  "consumption  index"  in 
Grossman&Helpman's quality ladder model
27, whereby a relation between the endogenous variable 
"Global Quantity of Innovation without capital mobility" (GQI) and the quality upgrade λ parameter is 
established: 
 
(22)                  ( ) ( ) λ λ log 0086 , 0        log    1 log log ⋅ = → ⋅ = − − ≡ GQI GQI t D t D gD              
 
,where gD denotes the growth rate in the consumption index in equation (1) above. So, setting a 
markup value (value for parameter λ ) implicitly determines the GQI value that the model without 
capital mobility must return in order to meet the observable gD = 0,0086. 
Next, for a given GQI value, we use the normalization L + L* = 100 
28, and then calculate the 
implicit parameter h value. Finally, given an estimate of h, we can use an expression analogous to (14) 
above to calculate what the global quantity of innovation would be under capital mobility (ιM ). Using 
                                                 
26 Further evidence on transitional dynamics perhaps not being so important in neoclassical growth models can be found in 
the estimates by Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996): the average time an economy spends to cover half of the distance 
between its initial position and its steady-state is about 7 years instead of 30 years as implied by earlier studies. 
 
27 see Grossman&Helpman (1991), pg.97 
 
28 A sensitivity analysis using the Mathematica program has proved that this normalization is harmless. 
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the  estimates  of  GQI  and  ιM  thus  obtained,  it  is  straightforward  comparing  welfare  levels  and 
calculating the Hicksian equivalent variation, for what we assume the dynamics to start already in 
steady-state.
29 
In table 1 below we report our findings for a case in which labor endowments don't differ much 
(L = 60 , L* = 40) and for a case where the home country is much bigger (L = 80 , L* = 20). In both 
cases we decided to calculate the Hicksian variation for several possible values of the parameter λ, 
which can then be thought of as representing markups for different industries. However, since we are 
interested on (aggregate) economic growth we should consider Hall's (1986) estimate that price is at 
least 1,28 times total marginal cost for the U.S. manufacturing industry as a whole, and take  λ = 1,3  




 λ λ λ λ (markup value)   Hicksian equivalent  %  
variation  (L = 60 , L* = 40) 
 Hicksian equivalent  %    
variation  (L = 80 , L* = 20) 
1,01  0,039  0,236 
1,05  0,317  1,460 
1,10  0,290  2,651 
1,20  0,686  5,999 
1,30  1,085  9,579 
1,40  1,495  12,948 
1,50  1,746  16,544 
1,60  2,069  19,659 
1,70  2,378  23,363 
1,80  2,534  25,644 
1,90  2,727  28,201 
2  2,848  30,871 
3  3,799  43,760 
4  4,364  47,426 
 
(table 1: markup values and Hicksian equivalent variations) 
 
                                                 
29 For details on this calculation, we ask the reader (again) to look at the corresponding section of our MATHEMATICAL 
APPENDIX. Notice also that we speak here of an expression analogous to (14) to calculate what the global quantity of 
innovation would be under capital mobility. This is because in this section we do not necessarily assume FPE under capital 
mobility. Given our assumption that 5 , 0 ) 1 (
1 =
− A , we will be typically considering cases such that L > L* and therefore W 
< W*, so that the home country performs all the R&D activity under capital mobility. To see why this must be so, see 
section II of our Mathematical Appendix. 
 
30 Maybe it would be more in the spirit of the quality ladder model to consider, instead of the markup for the manufacturing 
industry as a whole, only the average markup for “high-dif” (highly differentiated) goods, as defined by Chami Batista 
(2004): “If the long run price elasticity of substitution between US imports of the same good from 2 different countries is 
found to be positive or if no long run relationship is found between relative prices and quantities, the product is classified as 
HIGH-DIF. This means that international competition in these products is not predominantly based on price differences” 
The reader may also find it interesting to report here some of Hall's estimated markups for 2-digit industries: chemicals 
(1,62) , petroleum refining (1,1) , primary metals (1,28), fabricated metals (1,15) , machinery and instruments (around 1,17), 
communication (1,675), textiles (1,32) , electricity and gas generation (1,94).   18 
Inspecting table 1 we see that in the first case, when countries' sizes are practically equal, the 
impact of capital mobility in our endogenous growth trade model is about the same as that found by 
Gourinchas and Jeanne (2003) for the neoclassical growth model : a Hicksian variation of 1,085% for λ 
= 1,3 . In contrast, when countries sizes are significantly different, we get a Hicksian variation of  
9,57% for λ = 1,3, and up to 19,65% (for a markup around 1,6 as in the chemicals industry) or 30% (for 
a markup around 2, as in gas and electricity generation). 
 
 
6 - conclusions 
 
We have seen how the absence of international capital mobility (understood as licensing plus 
international  R&D  financing)  reduces  the  global  quantity  of  innovation  or  the  growth  rate  in  the 
Ricardian trade model with endogenous growth. In explaining why this happens, we highlighted the 
"invasion"  phenomenon  by  which  specialisation  in  R&D  and  production  according  to  comparative 
advantages breaks down for some industries. For Grossman&Helpman's functional forms, which made 
our model simple and computable, all the skilled labor diverted from innovation in the invasion range 
where profits are smaller is absorbed by final goods (inefficient) production inside the very invasion 
range.  
Our analysis also shows that the loss due to absence of international capital mobility is expected 
to be greater when trading partners differ much in market sizes / skilled labor endowments, or in 
comparative advantages in final goods production. This, together with the Ricardian specification of 
final  goods  technologies  may  incidentally  give  the  reader  a  flavor  of  North-South  relations-type 
analysis, but here we should note that with only one production factor (skilled labor), all international 
productivity differences must necessarily appear in a Ricardian fashion. Inspecting the Appendix, one 
will  realize  that  the  picture  of  the  world  that  we  had  in  mind  suggests  rather  a  North-North-type 
analysis, with the United States featuring  as the big country and the other major OECD countries 
standing for the small partners. To the conceivable ensuing objection that international financial capital 
mobility has always been a problem of minor importance among OECD countries, we respond that this 
is not exactly so in what concerns IPRs, so much so that the agreement between the World Intellectual 
Property Organization and the World Trade Organization regardind TRIPs dates from 1995, to take one 
example.    In  our  view,  as  the  “stylized  facts”  reported  in  the  introduction  suggest,  the  transition 
towards full capital/knowledge mobility among OECD countries is characteristic of the period mid-
80’s and 90’s. 
 
 
Appendix   –  patterns of specialization in production and in R&D 
 
Although the real world counterpart of our final goods production technology could perhaps be 
recovered using measurements of “unitary labor costs”
31, there is no such corresponding figure for 
research technology that we know of. So here we take the more roundabout approach of examining 
patterns of specialization in world exports and patenting. This is a sound approach because Taylor’s 
(1994) assumption that production and research technologies bear a perfect correspondence would lead 
to the prediction that, for a given country, both the “intensity” and the “extent” of specialization in 
trade and innovation go along together: for recall that prices are given by  ( ) ( )      W z a z p ⋅ ⋅ = λ , and 
                                                 
31 See, for example, the variables listed in Carlin et alli (1999) 
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demand for good z is simply the inverse of price, so that a country’s level of production, if it has 
comparative advantage and produces good z, is inversely proportional to its labor input requisite a(z). 
Now the equilibrium intensity of innovation is given by expression (14) above, which, adapted to 



























z ,  where  h(z)  is  the 
research labor input and µ is a constant of proportionality as in footnote 21 above. Thus, as a country 
moves  away  from  its  comparative  advantage  in  production,  its  intensity  of  innovation  decays. 
Furthermore, as can be seen in the last formula, this intensity decays more than proportionally to the 
increase in the labor input requisite. Therefore, in Taylor’s setup the intensity of innovation decays 
faster than the volume of production as a country moves away from its comparative advantage.
32 So we 
would expect countries to be more specialized in research than in production, what we next show not to 
hold when we examine patterns of specialization in world exports and patenting. 
We  measure  specialization  in  trade  at  sectors  level  using  RCA  (“revealed  comparative 
advantage”) coefficients: for a given country and a given product, the corresponding RCA coefficient is 
defined as that country’s share in world total exports of that product, divided by the country’s share in 
world total exports over all products. Therefore, a RCA coefficient bigger (smaller) than one means 
that that country is relatively much (little) specialized in that industry. Notice that RCA measures adjust 
for  “country  specific  effects”,  such  as  countries  sizes  and  openness  to  trade,  that might  otherwise 
invalidate international comparisons. For patenting, we use the analogous concept of RTA (“revealed 
technological advantage”) as in Patel and Pavitt (1995), only that the units of measurement are not 
values but numbers of patents granted. 
Since we are particularly interested on the phenomenon by which a “big” country invades a 
smaller country’s comparative advantage, it seems natural to perform here comparisons of RCA and 
RTA patterns taking countries two by two, with the United States (U.S.) representing always the big 
country. So, call the other country “ i ” and consider industry “j”. The measures of U.S. relative trade 
















rrta ≡    
 
Next, taking 3-digit data on patenting from the USPTO regrouped into 2-digit according to Hall 
et alli (2000) classification, and 2-digit data on exports from STAN-OECD database, we construct 
independent,  decreasing,  rrcai  and  rrtai  schedules  by  reordering  exported  goods  and  classes  of 
patents.
33  If, say, the resulting rrcai schedule is very steep, that means that the U.S. and country i are 
                                                 
32 For example, take two goods, j and k, such that a(k) = 2.a(j).  The volume of production of good j is twice the volume of 


































33 We speak of “independent” schedules because, when we match “goods” and “patent classes”,  the rrca and rrta orderings 
are, in general, quite different for the same country i : in real world situations, the correspondence between RCAs and RTAs 
is not only  not perfect, as in Taylor, but even not monotonic – put another way, if we were to keep the same ordering of 
goods we got from the decreasing rrca schedule and plot the corresponding rrta schedule, that latter might very well be 
increasing in some ranges of z. A regression analysis we performed elsewhere shows that, although the correlation between 
RTAs and RCAs is unambiguously positive, it is only of the order of 40%. 
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radically specialized in trade.  If, further, the rrtai schedule is less steep, we may conclude that the U.S. 
and country i are more specialized in final goods production (trade) than in R&D activity (patenting). 
Finally, the steep of our schedules is estimated as a “logarithmic decay rate”, according to 
 
j
i i d rrca rrca ) 1 ( 0   j   + ⋅ =     
 
, where “0” stands for the good or industry with the highest coefficient and j is the (j + 1)
st good in the 
ordering; d is the necessarily non-positive rate of decay.  Taking logs on both sides of last expression 
allows us to use OLS estimation. An entirely analogous procedure applies for rrta coefficients. 
 
We report below our findings about rrca and rrta decay rates for the pairs (U.S., i), with i = 
(France, Japan, UK, Germany, Italy): 
 
 
  (US, France)  (US, Japan)  (US, UK)  (US,Germany)  (US, Italy) 





















Note: standard errors in parenthesis 
 
 
For all the five pairs of countries we find that rrta schedules are significantly less steep than rrca 
schedules,  what  constitutes  evidence  of  less  specialization  in  R&D  (patents)  than  in  final  goods 
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